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THE MINORITY BUSINESS ENTERPRISE SET ASIDE: A
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
Congress enacted the Local Public Works Capital Development and
Investment Act of 1976 (LPW)' to help alleviate nationwide unemploy-
ment in the economically depressed construction industry.2 Under the
LPW, state or local government "grantees" can obtain federal funds for
public works projects.3 When additionhl funds were appropriated in 1977,1
section 6705(f)(2) was added to the LPW. This section conditions the
award of construction grants upon the grantee giving assurance that at
least 10% of the grant will be used to employ minority business enter-
prises.' A minority business enterprise (MBE) is defined by the statute as
a business at least 50% of which is owned by minority group members.
Thus, for a state or local government grantee using federal funds for a
particular project to comply with the MBE provision, a commitment must
be obtained from prime contractors bidding on the contract that at least
10% of the grant will be set aside for minority subcontractors or suppliers.
7
In the event that there are insufficient qualified MBEs within a reasonable
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6735 (1976).
2 The House Report accompanying the LPW Act stated that during 1974 and 1975 the
United States experienced its most severe recession since the 1930's. The Report emphasized
that the construction industry had been a major victim of this recession. See H.R. REP. No.
94-1077, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 [1976], reprinted in (1976) U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1746 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
3 Congress appropriated $2 billion to assist state and local governments to build "badly
needed" public facilities. 42 U.S.C. § 6710 (1976); see HousE REPORT, supra note 2 at 1747.
1 Public Works Employment Act of 1977 (PWE), 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6735 (1976). Under
the PWE Act, Congress appropriated an additional $4 billion to provide additional stimulus
to the sluggish economy. See H.R. REP. No. 95-20, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1977), reprinted
in [1977] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 150; S. REP. No. 95-38, 95th Cong. 1st Sess. (1977)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT]. The Senate Report emphasized that state and local
government outlays for new construction for the 10-year period since 1967 had dropped in
volume from $30.8 billion to $22 billion using 1972 dollars. SENATE REPORT, supra at 1-2. Since
the PWE Act retained the basic purposes and statutory scheme of the LPW Act, Ohio
Contractors Ass'n v. Economic Dev. Admin., 452 F. Supp. 1013, 1016-1020 (S.D. Ohio 1977),
grants under the PWE Act will be referred to as "LPW grants."
42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1976).
42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1976) defines minority group members as citizens of the United
States who are Negroes, Spanish-speaking, Orientals, Indians, Eskimos, and Aleuts. In the
case of a publicly owned business, at least 51% of the stock must be owned by minority group
members for it to qualify as a MBE. Id.
I Id. The LPW is administered by the Economic Development Administration (EDA).
EDA distributes federal funds to state and local government grantees who in turn contract
project construction work to the private sector through competitive bidding. 42 U.S.C. §§
6701-6705 (1976). Thus, grantees must award contracts to the contractor submitting the
lowest bid who assures that 10% of the funds will be used to employ MBEs. See id. at § 6705.
Congress directed that funds under the act be expended on an expedited basis by requiring
that applications either be approved or rejected by EDA within sixty days of receipt and that
construction commence within ninety days of project approval. 42 U.S.C. § 6705(d) (1976).
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proximity to the particular locality, the grantee can apply for a waiver of
the MBE requirement.
8
In several cases, non-minority contractors have attempted to get in-
junctions preventing the enforcement of section 6705(f)(2), arguing that
the MBE provision creates an impermissible racial classification in viola-
tion of the equal protection clause.' A number of district courts have de-
l Under regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Commerce, the 10% MBE require-
ment would not apply if the Assistant Secretary determined that the 10% set aside could not
be filled by minority businesses "located within a reasonable trade area determined in rela-
tion to the nature of the services or supplies intended to be procured." 13 C.F.R. §
317.19(b)(2) (1979). On June 6, 1977 the EDA issued Guidelines For Round 11 of the Local
Public Works Program which specify that a grantee must provide the Regional Director of
the EDA with a detailed statement of justification in support of a request for a waiver of the
MBE requirement before bids are requested. In August 1977 the EDA issued Guidelines for
1076 Minority Businnss Participation in LPW Grants which require local grantees to assist
prime contractors in locating and involving minority businesses in LPW Act grant projects.
No reported cases discuss instances in which the MBE waiver provisions have been utilized
by grantees.
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. § 1. See text accompanying notes 29-32 infra; notes 10 & 11
infra. Under the equal protection clause, legislative classifications which burden fundamental
rights must be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny. See generally L. TmEB, AMERuCAN CONsTI-
TUTIONAL LAW 991-1136 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TmaU]. Absent a compelling justification
such classifications are impermissible. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633
(1969) (denial of welfare benefits to persons living in administering jurisdictions less than one
year impairs fundamental right to interstate travel); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 670 (1966) (right to equal voting opportunity impaired by state poll tax). Strict
scrutiny is also triggered by "suspect" classifications which operate to prejudice racial and
ancestral minorities. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) (holding unconstitutional
state anti-miscegenation statute); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 217 (1944)
(upholding west coast incarceration and dispossession of persons of Japanese ancestry); Hira-
bayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 92 (1943) (upholding west coast curfew against persons
of Japanese ancestry); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308-09 (1879) (invalidating
state law denying blacks jury eligibility).
In Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), the Court held that facially neutral employ-
ment tests which have a disparate impact on minority group members will only be found to
violate the equal protection clause if an intent to discriminate can be shown. 426 U.S. at 240;
cf. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S., 424 (1971) (disparate impact definition of discrimina-
tion for purposes of employment discrimination under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act).
See generally Note, Proving Discriminatory Intent From a Facially Neutral Decision With a
Disproportionate Impact, 36 WASH. & LEE L. RFv. 109 (1979). The Court's holding in
Washington v. Davis is not apposite to challenges to the MBE "set asides" because the MBE
provision is not a facially neutral classification with a disparate impact on racial minorities
but rather, intentionally favors minorities. See note 16 infra.
The Supreme Court's decision in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), suggests
that congressional legislation involving benign "suspect" classifications may be judged by a
less strict standard of review. Developments in the Law - Equal Protection, 82 HARv. L. Rv.
1065, 1109 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protection]. Morgan construed congressional
power under the enforcement clause of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 5, to permit the enactment of any "appropriate legislation" to enforce equal protection,
including the regulation of state activity not itself violative of equal protection. 384 U.S. at
648, quoting Ex parte Va., 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880). See Cox, The Supreme Court 1965 Term,
Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80 HARv. L. Rv.
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nied injunctive relief without ruling on the constitutionality of the MBE
provision. 0 Although several courts have upheld the constitutionality of
the set asides," two federal district courts have found the 10% set asides
unconstitutional. 2 Any determination of the constitutionality of the MBE
91, 102-08 (1966). The Court in Morgan applied the standard of reasonableness articulated
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819), to test the congressional
legislation. 384 U.S. at 650. Commentators have argued that this more permissive standard
of review is appropriate when Congress enacts a remedial classification designed to extend
rights to minority groups who have previously been denied such rights. See, e.g., Ely, The
Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 1. Cm. L. REv. 723 (1974); Equal
Protection, supra at 1111; cf. R.I. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Kreps, 450
F. Supp. 338, 349 (D.R.I. 1978) (Congress has power to enact MBE provision under enforce-
ment clause of fourteenth amendment); text accompanying notes 84-86 infra.
" See, e.g., Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Economic Dev. Admin., 452 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.
Ohio 1977), affl'd, 580 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1978); R. I. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v.
Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 367 (D.R.I. 1978); Va. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps,
444 F. Supp. 1167 (W.D. Va. 1978); Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Secretary of Com-
merce, No. 77-4218 (D. Kan. 1977); Carolinas Branch, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps,
442 F. Supp, 392 (D.S.C. 1977); Mont. Contractors Ass'n i'. Secretary of Commerce, 439 F.
Supp. 1331 (D. Mont. 1977); Fla. East Coast Chapter v. Secretary of Commerce, No. 77-8351
(S.D. Fla. 1977). Courts which have denied preliminary injunctions against the MBE provi-
sion without ruling on its constitutionality generally have found that the plaintiffs had failed
to demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits and that the public interest in having LPW
funds expended expeditiously would be injured by issuance of an injunction. See, e.g., Va.
Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1167, 1180-86 (W.D. Va., 1978);
Mont. Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Commerce, 439 F. Supp. 1331 (D. Mont. 1977).
" In Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) aff'd, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir.
1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S. L.W. 3757 (1979), the Second Circuit applied the strict scrutiny
standard to the MBE set aside requirement and concluded that the provision was a constitu-
tionally valid exercise of congressional power to remedy the effects of previous discrimination
in the construction industry. In Ohio Contractors' Ass'n v. Economic Dev. Admin., 452 F.
Supp. 1013 (S.D. Ohio 1977), the district court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary
injunction, reasoning that the MBE provision was a necessary measure to combat discrimina-
tion against minority contractors. 452 F. Supp. at 1023-24. The court concluded that even if
the MBE provision was constitutionally defective, the loss of LPW grant monies to local
government grantees which would result from enjoining the MBE provision outweighed the
potential loss to plaintiff contractors. Id. at 1023. The Sixth Circuit in Ohio Contractors
concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to issue a prelimi-
nary injunction. 580 F.2d at 214.
In Constructors Ass'n v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1978), the Third Circuit affirmed
the district court's denial of plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction enjoining opera-
tion of the MBE 10% set aside provision. 573 F.2d at 820. The district court applied the strict
scrutiny standard of review and concluded that the MBE provision was constitutional since
Congress had enacted it pursuant to a compelling governmental interest in remedying the
past and present effects of discrimination against MBEs. Fullilove v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. at
952. The Third Circuit held that the district court had not abused its discretion in reaching
this decision. 573 F.2d at 820.
" In Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955 (C.D. Cal.
1977), vacated 98 S. Ct. 3132 (1978), the district court issued a declaratory judgement that
the MBE provision was unconstitutional and granted a prospective injunction prohibiting its
enforcement. 441 F. Supp. at 971. In addition to finding the MBE provision unconstitutional,
the court concluded that 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f) (2) discriminated against non-minority contrac-
19791 1225
1226 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW- [Vol. XXXVI
provision must be made both in terms of traditional constitutional princi-
ples and the Supreme Court's recent decision in Regents of the University
of California v. Bakke. 11
In Bakke, the Court held unconstitutional a special admissions pro-
gram at the University of California at Davis which set aside sixteen places
in each entering class for qualified members of minority groups." Although
the Court held Davis' special admissions program unconstitutional as a
tors and therefore was inconsistent with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000d, 2000d-1 (1976), which forbids discrimination under any program receiving Federal
financial assistance. The district court apparently reasoned that Title VI contains a definition
of discrimination that is "colorblind", thus prohibiting racial preferences such as that con-
tained in the MBE provision. This construction of Title VI is incorrect since Congress would
not likely enact a statute which clearly violates prior legislation. See Regents of the Univ. of
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 349 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
The Supreme Court remanded Associated Gen. Contractors for mootness because the
Secretary of Commerce had already granted all of the LPW funds and, therefore, a viable
case or controversy was no longer present. 459 F. Supp. at 769. On remand the district court
held that the challenge to the MBE provision was not moot because it was "capable of
repetition, yet evading review." 459 F. Supp. at 776. Southern Pac. Term. Co. v. I.C.C., 219
U.S. 498, 515 (1911); see Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1976). See also C.
WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF THE FEDERAL COURTS, § 12, at 39-40 (3d ed. 1976); Note,
Mootness on Appeal in the Supreme Court, 83 HARv. L. REV. 1672, 1685-87 (1970). Challenges
to the MBE provision were "capable of repetition" because Congress had considered re-
enactment of the LPW Act along with the MBE requirement, see note 9 infra, and "yet
evading review" because of the expeditious manner in which LPW funds are allocated. 459
F. Supp. at 776; see note 7 supra. The court on remand also reaffirmed its initial conclusion
that the MBE provision created an unconstitutional racial quota. 459 F. Supp. at 781.
In Wright Farms Constr., Inc. v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1023 (D. Vt. 1977), the district court
found that Vermont had a small minority population and concluded that the MBE provision
was unconstitutional as it applied to contractors in that state. This conclusion is unwarranted
since local and state government grantees may apply for a waiver of the 10% requirement in
the event that there are insufficient MBE's in a particular project area. See note 8 supra.
Moreover, the statements of the sponsor of the MBE provison clearly indicate that the set
aside provision would not apply in the case that there were no minority businesses in a
particular area. See 123 CONG. REC. H. 1437 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep.
Mitchell). The district court in Wright Farms emphasized that Congress had made no finding
that discrimination against minority contractors existed in Vermont. 444 F. Supp. at 1039.
Under the analogous situation of voting rights legislation, however, Congress need not make
specific findings of discrimination in each state. See R.I. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338, 354 n.13 (D.R.I. 1978). Congress' ban on literacy tests was
based on a general observation of the discriminatory effect of such tests instead of actual
findings in each state. See Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1976). The Supreme
Court upheld this ban despite the fact that, in many states, the literacy test was not used to
discriminate and despite the Court's refusal to find that literacy tests constituted a per se
constitutional violation. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132-34, 146-67, 216-17, 232-
36, 282-84 (1970); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (ban on literacy tests
in states with only 50% of eligible voters registered or actually voting); Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749, 777 (1975) (upholding Congress' use of broad classifications in place of indivi-
dualized determinations in spending program); Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscri-
mination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1, 32-33.
13 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
"1 Id. at 271.
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racial quota, it also held that Davis could consider race as a factor in its
future admissions decisions.'5 Since the 10% set asides create an explicitly
race-based condition on the receipt of LPW funds," the constitutionality
of the MBE provision is facially suspect in light of the Bakke decision.
1 7
The first issue presented by the MBE requirement is whether the plain-
tiffs have standing to challenge the statute.' Courts have been willing to
grant standing to both individual construction companies and associations
representing general contractors, reasoning that both face injury in fact.'"
Prime contractors who are low bidders on construction projects are injured
when grantees do not award them contracts because they have failed to set
aside 10% of the grant for minority subcontractors."0 Thus, application of
the MBE requirement removes noncomplying contractors from considera-
tion for an identified percentage of federal construction funds.2' Further-
more, prime contractors are potentially harmed when, in order to comply
with the LPW Act, they employ more expensive subcontractors than they
5 Id. at 315-18. Bakke argued that his exclusion from medical school violated Title VI
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1976), and his constitutional rights under
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 277-78. Justice Brennan,
joined by Justices White, Marshall and Blackmun, wrote an opinion which held that the
Davis program was constitutional and that it did not violate Title VI. 438 U.S. at 324. Justice
Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, avoided the
constitutional issue under the equal protection clause, but concluded that the Davis program
did violate Title VI. Id. at 408-21.
Justice Powell wrote a separate opinion on the constitutional and statutory issues. Id. at
281-87, 291-320. Although he disagreed with Justices Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist and Chief
Justice Burger on the meaning of Title VI, he did conclude that the Davis program violated
the equal protection clause and Title VI. Id. at 284-87.
"1 42 U.S.C. § 6705 (0(2) (1976). The Secretary of Commerce has acknowledged that the
MBE provision creates an explicitly race-based condition on the receipt of the PWE Act
funds. Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 602 (2d Cir. 1978).
1 The Fullilove decision 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978), upholding the constitutionality of
the MBE provision is of particular interest since it is the first circuit court ruling on the 10%
set asides after Bakke. In Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 459 F.
Supp. 766 (C.D. Cal. 1978), however, the district court, on remand from the Supreme Court,
held that Bakke did not affect its initial conclusion that the MBE provision created an
impermissable racial quota. 459 F. Supp. at 780; see text accompanying notes 47 infra.
"1 In order to be granted standing, the party must have alleged such a "personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy," Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962), as to ensure that
"the dispute sought to be adjudicated will be presented in an adversary context and in a form
historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968);
see Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972); U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2.
" See, e.g., Va. Chapter, Assoc. Gen. Contr. v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1167 (W.D. Va.
1978); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955 (C.
D. Cal. 1977); Constructors Ass'n of W. Pa. v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936 (W.D. Pa. 1977) aff'd,
573 F.2d 811 (1978).
21 Cf. Va. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1167, 1176 (W.D.
Va. 1978) (non-minority electrical contractor denied contract due to general contractor's
failure to comply with MBE provision). See note 7 supra.
1 See note 19 supra.
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would otherwise employ, resulting in the submission of higher bids. 22 Asso-
ciations representing contractors are potentially injured by the LPW since
the MBE provision discriminates against their members on the basis of
race, thereby preventing the organizational objective of non-
discriminatory bidding on public contracts.2 Thus, the courts are war-
ranted in granting standing to these contractor associations.
The second issue posed by the MBE provision is whether the waiver
provision available to grantees is an effective administrative remedy which
all plaintiffs should be required to exhaust before seeking judicial review
of the act's constitutionality. 4 Courts have given two reasons why the
exhaustion doctrine does not apply to challenges of the MBE provision.
First, only local and state government grantees can apply for a waiver of
the MBE requirement.2 The alleged remedy provided by the waiver provi-
sion, therefore, is not available to prime contractors or contractor associa-
tions.2 1 Since this remedy is not available to contractors, they have no
administrative relief. Second, plaintiffs challenging the constitutionality
of a statute have been held exempt from the exhaustion doctrine because
administrative agencies do not have jurisdiction to rule on the constitu-
tionality of congressional enactments. 27 Constitutional challenges to the
See Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955, 962
(C.D. Cal. 1977). Although all general contractors must comply with the MBE provision, a
general contractor who normally does not employ minority subcontractors is put at a competi-
tive disadvantage when bidding against a general contractor who has had previous subcon-
tracting work done by MBE's. Any contractor who is required to hire more expensive subcon-
tractors will be harmed since his profit margin will be reduced. Moreover, a general contractor
will suffer economic injury if he must hire MBEs to do work which he would normally do
himself. See Constructors Association v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936, 945 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
2 See note 10 supra. An organization has standing to bring suit on behalf of its members
when its members would have standing to sue in their own right or when the interests it seeks
to protect relate to the organization's purpose. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Comm'n., 432 U.S. 333, 340; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 511 (1975). Since individual
contractors have standing to challenge the MBE provision, contractor associations also have
standing to sue on behalf of their members.
21 See notes 8 & 10 supra. The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is well
established in the area of administrative law. See generally K. DAVIS, ADMIMSTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE § § 20.01-20.10 (1958). The doctrine provides that a party is not entitled to judicial
relief for an alleged injury until he has "exhausted" the prescribed administrative remedy.
Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbldg. Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1938). The purposes of the exhaus-
tion doctrine are avoidance of interruption of an agency's duty to apply a statute, develop-
ment of the factual background upon which decisions should be based, and deference to the
agency's discretion and expertise. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193-94 (1969).
25 See note 8 supra.
21 Va. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1167, 1178 (W.D.
1978); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955, 962 (C.D.
Cal. 1977). The exhaustion doctrine does not apply to a party to whom existing administrative
remedies are either unavailable or will not grant him full relief. McNeese v. Board of Educ.,
373 U.S. 668, 674-76 (1963).
27 Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 242 (1968), (constitutional challenge
to Selective Service Act of 1967, 50 U.S.C. App. § 456 (1970)). Attacks on enabling statutes
have been held exempt from the exhaustion requirement because an administrative body
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MBE provision fall within this exception to the exhaustion doctrine. 2 Con-
sequently, courts have properly permitted plaintiff contractors and con-
tractors associations to seek judicial relief from the application of the MBE
requirement.
Plaintiffs challenging the 10% set-aside requirement have contended
that the MBE provision creates a discriminatory racial and ethnic quota
in violation of the fifth amendment.2 9 Although the fifth amendment does
not contain an equal protection clause, its due process clause incorporates
the equal protection element prohibiting racial discrimination to the same
extent as the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.3
Under the equal protection clause, racial classifications are "suspect" and
are subject "to the most rigid scrutiny." 3' This strict scrutiny standard
requires that the governmental objective advanced by the classification
serve a "compelling state interest" and that the means of accomplishing
the objective must be the least discriminatory means available.
2
Despite the suspect nature of racial classifications, however, the courts
have recognized that remedies for prior discrimination must consider race
in order to fully eradicate the effects of previous discrimination.3 Thus, the
cannot be expected to rule on the constitutionality of the very act which established it. E.g.
Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765 (1975); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 368 (1974);
Public Utilities Comm'n. of Cal. v. United States, 355 U.S. 534, 539-40 (1958); K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES, § 20.04 (1976).
2 See note 26 supra.
29 See note 10 supra; U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1.
30 E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361,
364 (1974) (upholding denial of veteran's benefits to conscientious objector who performed
civilian service); Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 78, 81 (1971) (reduction of social security
benefits to reflect workmen's compensation payments not violative of fifth amendment due
process); Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954); see note 9 supra; TRIBE, supra note 9 at
800, 810, 922, 1063 (1978); Karst, supra note 9; Comment, Should Bakke Affect Title Vii: A
Constitutional Analysis, 6 SAN FERN. U. L. REv. 75 (1977).
11 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); see note 9 supra.
32 See note 9 supra; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 337 (1972) (state's denial of right
to vote due to durational residency requirement subject to strict scrutiny); Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F.2d at
964-65; Sherain, The Questionable Legality of Affirmative Action, 51 J. URB. L. 25 (1973).
Absent a compelling governmental interest, preferential treatment of minorities becomes
illegal reverse discrimination against the majority. See, e.g., Kirkland v. New York State
Dep't of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420, 430 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976)
(judicially imposed promotion quota constituted reverse discrimination because no alleged
past discrimination); Harper v. Kloster, 486 F.2d 1134, 1138 (4th Cir. 1973) (invalidating
racial hiring quotas because effective relief possible without resort to quotas). See generally
Wright Farms Constr., Inc. v. Kreps, 444 F. Supp. 1023, 1032-37 (D.Vt. 1977); see also Ely,
The Constitutionality of Reverse Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 723, 727 (1974) (arguing
that racial classification is not "suspect" when majority discriminates against itself).
The Supreme Court has approved the use of racial classifications to achieve school
desegregation. See, e.g, Nqrth Carolina v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45-46 (1971); Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15-21 (1971); United States v. Montgomery
County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S. 225 (1969).
The recognition of race in the selection of union members and construction workers has
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fact that a racial classification is intended to remedy the adverse effects
of past or present discrimination may indicate a compelling governmental
interest sufficient to justify the use of such a classification.3 The Bakke
decision does not significantly alter the Supreme Court's position in favor
of recognizing that remedies for prior discrimination may consider race.,
withstood constitutional challenge in two contexts. Constructors Assoc. of W. Pa. v. Kreps,
441 F. Supp. 936, 948 (D.W.Pa. 1977). First, courts have ordered remedial action for past
discrimination pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)
(1976). Courts have ordered unions to grant immediate membership to a number of minority
applicants, United States v. Wood, Wire, and Metal Lathers Int'l Union, Local No. 46, 471
F.2d 408 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 939 (1973), to begin an affirmative minority recruit-
ment program, United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local No. 36, 416 F.2d 123
(8th Cir. 1969), and to take on a certain number of minority apprentices for each class of
workers, United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
984 (1971). Courts have also ordered employers to hire minority employees up to 30% of the
total work force, Stamps v. Detroit Edison, 365 F. Supp. 87 (E.D. Mich. 1973), to hire one
minority worker every time two white workers were hired, up to a certain number, Carter v.
Gallegher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972), and to give priority
in future hiring to black and Spanish-speaking applicants for police positions who had failed
to qualify under a constitutionally impermissible set of hiring standards. Castro v. Beecher,
459 F.2d 725 (3d Cir. 1972).
The second context in which race has been recognized as a permissible criterion for
employment is where courts have upheld affirmative action to remedy the disproportionately
low employment of minorities in the construction industry pursuant to Executive Order No.
11, 246, 40 Fed. Reg. 12319 (1965). Courts have upheld the specific percentage goals found in
several plans developed to implement this Order. See, e.g., Southern Ill. Builders Ass'n v.
Ogilvie, 327 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D. Ill. 1971), aff'd, 471 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1972) (Illinois Ogilvie
Plan); Joyce v. McCrane, 320 F. Supp. 1284 (D.N.J. 1970) (Newark Plan); Contractors Ass'n
v. Secretary of Labor, 311 F. Supp. 1002 (E.D. Pa. 1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (Philadelphia Plan); Weiner v. Cuyahage Community College
School District, 19 Ohio St. 2d 35, 249 N.E. 2d 907, 908 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1004
(Cleveland Plan). See also Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. Altshuler, 361 F. Supp. 1293
(D. Mass.), aff'd, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974) (upholding state
20% minority employment quota); Comment, The Philadelphia Plan: A Study on The Dy-
namics of Executive Power, 39 U. CH. L. REv. 732, 747-57 (1972). Courts upholding these
federal affirmative action programs from challenges under the equal protection clause or
under the anti-preference provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-2(j) (1976) have reasoned that public authorities have discretionary power to remedy
past discrimination that is even broader than that of the judicial branch. See Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.9. at 16. This line of reasoning suggests that
Congress has discretionary authority to enact provisions such as the MBE preference to
remedy past discrimination. Accord, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 302
n.41 (1978) (opinion of Powell, J.).
11 Several courts which have considered challenges to the 10% MBE requirement have
held that a compelling state interest exists if the racial classification is intended to remedy
prior discrimination. See, e.g., Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1977),
aff'd, 584 F.2d 600, 603 (2d Cir. 1978) (decided after Bakke); Constructors Ass'n of W. Pa. v.
Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936, 950 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd, 573 F.2d 811, 816 (3d Cir. 1978).
I In Bakke, Justice Brennan stated that "Government may take race into account when
it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minori-
ties by past racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been made by judicial,
legislative, or administrative bodies with competence to act in this area." 438 U.S. at 325
(opinion of Brennan, J.); see id. at 307 (opinion of Powell, J.).
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Since the MBE requirement distinguishes among various business enter-
prises based upon the racial background of their owners," the provision can
be upheld only if it is intended to remedy prior discrimination.
The issue of whether the MBE provision was designed to eliminate the
vestiges of racial discrimination is composed of two intertwined, yet ana-
lytically distinct, elements." The first element concerns the Congressional
enactment of the 10% MBE requirement as a remedy for past discrimina-
tion." Whether discrimination has in fact occurred is the second element.'
Disagreement among courts over the constitutionality of the MBE provi-
sion has resulted in part from different treatment of these questions."
The congressional purpose underlying the enactment of the MBE provi-
sion cannot be discerned by examining the reports of the Senate and House
committees that considered the 1977 version of the LPW Act.4 ' This formal
legislative history contains no mention of the minority business set aside
because the 10% requirement was proposed as an amendment at a rela-
tively late date in the bill's history and therefore, was never considered by
any congressional committee 2 Inquiry into the congressional intent in
enacting the MBE provision has focused on statements made by Repre-
sentative Mitchell, the sponsor of the amendment, during the debate.13
Mitchell stated that minority contractors were receiving only 1% of govern-
ment contracts in any given fiscal year and expressed concern that minor-
ity enterprises could not be incorporated into the economic system without
setting aside funds.4 In Associated General Contractors v. Secretary of
Commerce,45 the district court discounted Representative Mitchell's re-
marks as "debate rhetoric"46 and concluded that the only objective of the
MBE provision was to direct financial assistance to minority businesses
36 See 42 U.S.C. § 6705(f)(2) (1976); note 16 supra.
Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 603 (2d Cir. 1978).
'Id.
3' Id.
40 Compare Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1978) and Constructors Ass'n v.
Kreps, 573 F.2d 811 (3d Cir. 1978) (MBE provision enacted to remedy past discrimination
against minority contractors) with Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce,
441 F. Supp. 955 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (holding lack of evidence of past discrimination precludes
finding that MBE provision is remedial).
"1 See H.R. REP. No. 95-20, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 150; SENATE REPORT, supra note 4.
" See note 41 supra; Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). One
district court has viewed the paucity of legislative history on the MBE provision as
"troublesome." Constructors Ass'n v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936, 952 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
'3 See 123 CONG. REc. H. 32 1437 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977); see also Fullilove v. Kreps,
584 F.2d 600, 605 (2d Cir. 1978); Constructors Ass'n of W. Pa. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 817 n.
22 (3d Cir. 1978); Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp.
955, 960, 965, 969 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
1' See 123 CONG. REc. H. 32 1436 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977).
15 441 F. Supp. 955 (C.D. Cal. 1977).
4' 441 F. Supp. at 969.
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solely on the basis of race to the exclusion of non-minority businesses.17 The
court refused to find that a congressional desire to remedy prior discrimi-
nation was implicit in Mitchell's remarks because Mitchell had not pre-
sented specific evidence of discrimination against minority contractors.
The position of the district court in Associated General Contractors is
questionable since the Supreme Court has held that Congress has discre-
tionary authority to take appropriate measures to remedy the effects of
past and present discrimination where there is some evidence that discrim-
ination does in fact exist.49 In Bakke, Justice Powell reaffirmed the view
that the judiciary should defer to congressional legislation which remedies
past discrimination based on the enforcement clauses of the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments 0 Thus, in upholding the constitutionality of the
MBE provision, courts have correctly considered both the floor debate
surrounding its adoption and the "societal and legislative context" within
which the provision was meant to operate.-' These courts have been willing
to infer that the Congressional purpose was to remedy prior discrimination
from the remarks of Representative Mitchell and from Representative
Conyers' observation that "minority contractors and businessmen who are
trying to enter in on the bidding process . . . get the 'works' almost every
time."" Although these statements do not explicitly attribute the difficul-
, Id. at 965.
I' !d.
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 656 (1966). In Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426
U.S. 88 (1976), the Court stated that if a rule were "expressly mandated by the Congress or
the President, we might presume that any interest which might rationally be served by the
rule did in fact rise to its adoption." Id. at 103. In Fullilove, the Second Circuit quoted from
Morgan, stating that "it is 'enough that [the court] perceive a basis upon which Congress
might predicate a judgement that' the MBE amendment would remedy past discrimination
against minority construction businesses." 584 F.2d at 604-05. See note 9 supra.
1 438 U.S. at 302 n.41 (opinion of Powell, J.). Congress has power under the thirteenth
amendment to eliminate all "badges and incidents of slavery." The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 20 (1833); see U.S. CONST. amend. XIII. In Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S.
409 (1968) the Court stated that "Congress has the power ... rationally to determine what
are the badges and incidents of slavery." 392 U.S. at 440. In R.I. Chapter, Associated Gen.
Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338 (1978) the district court concluded that discrimination
in the making of contracts is a badge and incident of slavery. 450 F. Supp. at 364; cf. Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer 392 U.S. at 441-43 (prohibiting racial discrimination by private parties
in sale or rental of property); Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, Inc., 410 U.S.
431, 439-40 (1973)(discriminatory membership policy of community swimming pool). Con-
gress, therefore, has power under the thirteenth amendment to enact the MBE provision to
eliminate this discrimination. 450 F. Supp. at 360-66. See generally Note, Federal Power to
Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruc-
tion Era Amendments. 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449 (1974); Note, Jones v. Mayer: The Thirteenth
Amendment and the Federal Anti-Discriminaton Laws, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 1019 (1969); Note,
The "New" Thirteenth Amendment: A Preliminary Analysis, 82 HAav. L. REv. 1294 (1969).
11 Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. at 258; see R. I. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors
v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. at 355. See also Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc. v. CAB, 310 F.2d 770, 782 (2d Cir. 1967) (statements made in debates
are authoritative indicia of congressional intent).
52 123 CONG. REC. H. 32 1440 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977), reprinted in Associated Gen.
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ties encountered by minority businesses to racial discrimination, a con-
gressional purpose to remedy discrimination can properly be inferred from
the MBE provision itself.53 In such a case, "recourse to internal legislative
history and other ancillary materials is unnecessary."54 In view of recent
congressional antidiscrimination legislation,5 the MBE provision was most
likely designed to remedy racial discrimination rather than to discriminate
against non-minority business enterprises.
Although the 1977 version of the LPW Act does not include a purpose
clause necessitating an explicit finding of past racial discrimination, "5 7 the
floor debate of the MBE provision documents discrimination in the con-
struction industry. The statistical disparity between minority group rep-
resentation in the general population and their low level of involvement in
economic activity is also indicative of prior racial discrimination. 9 More-
over, findings by the federal government under other antidiscrimination
efforts support the conclusion that discrimination exists in the construc-
tion industry." Since Congress had previously set up many programs to
provide assistance to minority enterprises,' the MBE provision was proba-
bly incorporated into the LPW Act after only brief debate because of a
Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955, 997-1006 (C.D. Cal. 1977) (Appendix
C); see Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. at 258.
0 Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d at 604. The Second Circuit reasoned that the MBE provi-
sion made no sense unless it was construed as a remedial measure to benefit minority subcon-
tractors. Id.
-5 Id. quoting Equal Protection, supra note 9, at 1077.
E.g., Voting Rights Amendments of 1975, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 et seq. (1976); Civil Rights
Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 231, 233, 241, 242, 245, 1153, 2101, 2102 (1976); Civil Rights Act of
1964, 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (1976).
" Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d at 605; see Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, note 48 supra.
, See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6701-6735 (1976); note 4 supra.
See 123 CONG. REc. H. 32 1437 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977) (remarks of Rep. Mitchell);
Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d at 605; Constructors Ass'n of W. Pa. v. Kreps, 573 F.2d 811, 817
n.21 (3d Cir. 1978).
1' Although the United States has a minority population of approximately 17%, only
about 4% of all businesses are controlled by members of minority groups, and they account
for less than 1% of national gross business receipts. OFFc oF MINoRTY BUSINEss ENTEIRRISE,
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MINomrY BusINEss OPPORTUNITY HANDBOOK, I-1 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as MiNomRTY BusINEsS HANDBOOK]; see REORT OF THE HOUSE COMMITTEE
ON SMAu BUSINESS, H.R. REP. No. 1791, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 124 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as REPORT ON SMALL Busnuss]; Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. at 258.
0 See, e.g., REPORT ON SMALL BUSnmSS, supra note 59, at 182-83; UNITED STATES COMM'N.
ON CivL RiGmrs, MNoRIrEs AND WOMEN As GoVERNMENT CONTRACTORS (1977) [hereinafter
cited as GoVERNMENT CGNTRACrORs]; MINORITY BusINESS HANDBOOK, supra note 59 at 1-1-2.
" There are thirty-five federal assistance programs designed particularly for minority
enterprises. See Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. at 259 n. 14; OFFICE OF MiNorY ENTRRmsE,
UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS FOR MINoRIrY BUSINESS
ENTmPRisES (1977); see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 11,625, 36 Fed. Reg. 199 (1971) (requiring
federal agencies to increase efforts promoting minority business enterprise); 41 C.F.R. § 1-
1.1302 (1975) (requiring federal agencies to establish minority contractor procurement pro-
gram). See generally Constructors Ass'n. v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936, 951 n.8 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
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general awareness of discrimination against minority businesses seeking to
participate in government contracting.
2
Since Congress could reasonably have found that discrimination ex-
isted in the construction industry, it had discretionary authority to take
appropriate remedial measures. 3 Although remedying past racial discrimi-
nation constitutes a compelling governmental interest, the strict scrutiny
standard which courts have applied to the MBE provision also requires
that Congress adopt the least discriminatory method of accomplishing its
objective." Plaintiffs challenging the MBE provision have asserted that
increased minority participation in the construction industry could be
achieved by providing minority businesses with additional capital through
loans or advances. 5 Representative Mitchell, however, stated that capital
assistance to minority owned businesses under the Office of Minority Busi-
ness Enterprise and Small Business Administration programs66 has been
unsuccessful in raising minority business participation in federal contracts
above 1%.17 This low level of participation may be due in part to the fact
that the majority of minority businesses are small, specialty contractors
with whom government agencies rarely contract directly. 8 Since construc-
tion contractors prefer to deal with firms that have an established record,
minority businesses have difficulty breaking into the industry.69 Moreover,
government studies have reported that voluntary plans to obtain minority
subcontractors on government projects have been totally ineffective .7
Thus, only by requiring prime contractors to provide subcontracting op-
portunities to minority businesses in large scale construction contracts can
these minority businesses gain the necessary experience and the resultant
confidence of prime contractors'.
7
62 Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. at 259.
6 See text accompanying notes 33-35 supra; note 98 infra.
6, See text accompanying note 32 supra; note 9 supra; Associated Gen. Contractors v.
Kreps, 441 F. Supp. at 965.
11 See Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. at 260. Congress could have assisted MBEs
through increased cash advances to minority contractors pursuant to 41 C.F.R. §§ 1-30.400-
1-31.419 (1977). Under § 8(a) of the Small Business Act, 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (1976), Congress
could increase the number of government procurement contracts let to businesses owned by
socially or economically disadvantaged persons. See 13 C.F.R. § 124.8-1(b) (1977).
66 See note 6 supra.
67 123 CONG. REc. H. 32 1437 (daily ed. Feb. 24, 1977). See GovERNNiriE CoNTRAcroRs,
supra note 60 at 35-62. The majority of courts have agreed that other, less drastic means to
increase MBE participation in federal contracts actually have been tried and have failed. See,
e.g., R.I. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338, 359 (D.R.I. 1978);
Ohio Contractors Ass'n v. Economic Dev. Admin., 452 F. Supp. 1013, 1022 (S.C. Ohio 1977);
Constructors Ass'n v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936, 952-53 (W.D. Pa. 1977).
" See R. I. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338, 359-60
(D.R.I. 1978).
69 Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
70 See R. I. Chapter, Associated Gen. Contractors v. Kreps, 450 F. Supp. 338, 359 (D.R.I.
1978).
71 Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253, 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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In Associated General Contractors, the court reasoned that underem-
ployed minorities in the construction industry could be aided by racially
neutral legislation, suggesting that the 10% set aside could be directed at
those economically disadvantaged businesses which had recently experi-
enced a high level of unemployment.7 2 This position fails to recognize that
the LPW Act was enacted to "reactivate the distressed construction indus-
try" at a time when all construction firms were at an economic disadvan-
tage. 3 Consequently, redefining the 10% set aside to include all such con-
struction companies would be tantamount to eliminating the set aside
provision entirely.
In determining whether the 10% set asides are an appropriate means
to rectify prior discrimination, the burden imposed upon non-minority
contractors must be balanced against the compelling governmental inter-
est in eliminating employment discrimination.74 Courts considering chal-
lenges to the MBE set asides have concluded that the 10% figure is a
reasonable one that does not impose an inequitable burden upon non-
minority contractors. 5 This conclusion is proper in light of the relatively
small amount of business from which the MBE provision excludes non-
minority contractors. The $4 billion added to the LPW in 197776 amounted
to approximately 2.5% of the total of nearly $170 billion spent on construc-
tion in 1977.71 Since the MBE provision provided for a 10% set aside of
LPW funds, it applied to only .25% of the total dollar amount expended
in 1977 on construction work in the United States. 8 Since minority busi-
nesses amounted to only 4.3% of the total number of firms in the construc-
"Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce, 441 F. Supp. 955, 965-66 (C.D.
Cal. 1977).
7' See H.R. REP. No. 95-20, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in (1977) U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 150; text accompanying notes 1-4 supra.
71 Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 606-07 (2d Cir. 1978). In Franks v. Bowman Transp.
Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976), Justice Powell implied that affirmative action to remedy past
discrimination must not exceed the bounds of fundamental fairness by disregarding equitable
considerations. See 424 U.S. at 784-86. (Powell, J., concurring and dissenting). The effects
of remedial measures to benefit racial minorities cannot be concentrated upon a relatively
small, ascertainable group of non-minority persons. EEOC v. Local 638, Sheet Metal Work-
ers, 532 F.2d 821, 828 (2d Cir. 1976).
Is E.g., Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 607-08 (2d Cir. 1978); Ohio Contractors Ass'n
v. Economic Dev. Admin., 452 F. Supp. 1013,1022-23 (S.D. Ohio 1977). In Constructors Ass'n
v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936 (W.D. Pa. 1977) the court reasoned that the 10% set aside figure
was not unreasonable since grantees could apply for a waiver of the MBE requirements where
insufficient MBEs were available in the particular area. 441 F. Supp. at 936, 950-54; see note
8 supra.
11 42 U.S.C. § 6710 (1976); see note 3 supra.
17 U.S. DEP'T OF CoMMERcE, INDusTRY AND TRADE ADMINISTRATION, CONSTRUcTION REvIEW,
(May-June 1978), at 11. The $170 billion figure relates to the total amount spent on all
construction in 1977 rather than to the amount expended by the federal government in that
year.
78 Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 607 (2d Cir. 1978).
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tion industry, 79 the burden of being excluded from the .25% of these con-
struction funds was not concentrated on a small group of non-minority
contractors but rather was spread among contractors comprising 96% of
the industry. 0 Moreover, since the MBE requirement was subject to a cut-
off date of December 31, 1978,11 the short time span of the set aside pro-
gram minimized the burden on non-minority contractors. 2 Non-minority
businesses have been benefitted in the past by the exclusion of minority
businesses from the industry. This prior benefit may justify the minimal
exclusion of non-minority businesses from competing for 10% of the LPW
Act grants.84
Although courts which have upheld the constitutionality of the MBE
provision have applied the strict scrutiny standard of review, the Bakke
decision may require a less stringent standard of review where remedial
racial classifications are involved. Justice Brennan stated that an
"ostensibly benign" racial classification could be justified by showing "an
important and articulated purpose for its use."' In addition, a remedial
statute could not operate to stigmatize or single out any discrete and
insular non-minority group. 6 Justice Brennan also reasoned that the need
to provide a remedy for victims of discrimination and society's interest in
eliminating racial discrimination provide important purposes which justify
affirmative action programs." Although Justice Brennan, White, Marshall
and Blackmun would require racial classifications to be remedial, they
would not require specific findings of past or present discrimination.M The
11 U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1972 CENSUS OF CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRIES: INDUSTRIAL
SERIES, UNITED STATES SUMMARY-STATISTICS FOR CONSTRUCTION ESTABLISHMENTS WITH AND
WITHOUT PAYROLLS, Table Al (Aug. 1975); U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1972 SURVEY OF
MINORITY-OWNED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES: MINoRIr-OwNED BUSINESSES, Table 1 (May 1975).
Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 608 (2d Cir. 1978); see note 79 supra.
" See Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 608 (2d Cir. 1978); REPORT ON SMALL BUSINESS,
supra note 59 at 182-83. See generally BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (1971);
Glenn, White Gains From Negro Subordination, SOCIAL PROBLEMS 159 (1966).
11 See Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 608 (2d Cir. 1978). In Bakke, Justice Powell
rejected the view that discrimination against the white "majority" is permissible if it is
intended to remedy the effects of general societal discrimination against minority groups. 438
U.S. at 294-99. Justice Powell, however, approved the use of racial preferences to remedy
identified discrimination in a particular industry even though this relief imposed some bjur-
dens on non-minority employees. Id. at 301-02; citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424
U.S. 747 (1976). Justices Brennan's opinion in Bakke cited the MBE provision as confirming
that race could be considered as part of a remedy for societal discrimination. 438 U.S. at 348-
49. Thus, the concurring Justices apparently believe that the 10% set asides do not impose
an unreasonable burden on non-minority businesses.
438 U.S. at 361.
86 Id. See United Jewish Org. of Williamsburgh v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977); Washing-
ton v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
'7 438 U.S. at 362.
438 U.S. at 362-69. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and Blackmun would permit
race-conscious programs "where there is reason to believe that the evil addressed is a product
of past racial discrimination." Id. at 366. Justice Brennan emphasized that race-conscious
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remedial nature of a racial classification could be demonstrated after-the-
fact at the time the statute is challenged." Under the Brennan group's less
stringent form of review for "benign" racial classifications, the MBE provi-
sion would most likely be upheld.
Justice Powell disagreed with the standard of review adopted by Jus-
tices Brennan0 concluding that strict scrutiny must be applied to all racial
classifications." He acknowledged, however, that the government had a
"substantial" interest in remedying prior discrimination found by judicial,
legislative or administrative bodies.2 This discrimination may be general
in the industry affected rather than specific to the entity utilizing an
affirmative action program. 3 The flexibility of this findings requirement,
coupled with the replacement of the normal "compelling state interest"
phrase with the "substantial" government interest terminology indicates
that Justice Powell may be moving away from a standard of review which
has been termed "strict in theory" and "fatal in fact." 4
Although Justices Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist and Chief Justice
Burger did not reach the constitutional issue in Bakke, all four have pre-
viously endorsed remedial racial preferences in other contexts. Justice
Stevens' opinion does not indicate whether the four justices would agree
with Justice Powell and require prior judicial, legislative or administrative
findings of discrimination or whether they would simply require an after-
remedies have been approved in the absence of explicit findings of past discrimination; Id.
at 364-66; see, e.g., International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 432 U.S. 324, 357-62
(1977) (sufficient that recipient of preferential advancement is within class of persons likely
to have been victims of discrimination); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976)
(judicially imposed preference where no finding that employer acted with discriminatory
intent); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (voluntary
adoption of school desegregation plan with fixed racial ratio).
1, 438 U.S. at 364. Justice Brennan reasoned that judicial intervention was a last resort
to stop illegal conduct rather than a prerequisite to voluntary remedial action. Id.
o See id. at 294 n.34.
" Id. at 290-91.
92 438 U.S. at 307-08.
, See id. at 301-02 (citing Associted Gen. Contractors v. Altshuler, 490 F.2d 9 (1st Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974)); Contractors Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d
159, 175 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
" See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court: A Model For a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. Rxv. 1, 8 (1972).
" See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Albermarle Paper Co.
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975) (requiring differential validation of employment tests having
disparate impact on different races). Justices Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist and Chief Justice
Burger have endorsed the principle that a governmental action does not violate the equal
protection clause in the absence of purposeful discrimination. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S.
229 (1976). In Washington, Justices Stevens, Stewart, Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger
joined Justice White's approval of the affirmative recruiting of black applicants by the Dis-
trict of Columbia police department. See 426 U.S. at 246 (opinion of White, J.), 426 U.S. at
254 (Stevens, J., concurring). This affirmative recruiting constitutes use of a racial preference
at the initial level. See Scherer, Bakke Revisted, 7 HUMAN RiGHTs 22, 24 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Scherer].
19791 1237
1238 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXVI
the-fact demonstration of the remedial nature of a racial classification
advocated by Justice Brennan. One commentator has suggested that at
least one of the Stevens four would have adopted the Brennan view.",
Therefore, the Brennan group's opinion that a less stringent standard of
review is mandated when "benign" racial classifications are involved could
be considered to be the present position of the Supreme Court. 
9
Since Justice Powell indicated that Congress should be accorded a large
degree of judicial restraint in its enactment of remedial legislation,"' the
standard of review applied to the MBE provision should not affect the
outcome of future challenges to the 10% set asides. If, however, the lower
courts strictly interpret Justice Powell's findings requirement in Bakke,
they may be more willing to defer to Congress' judgement where the pur-
pose of the legislation appears explicitly in the record. Thus, if Congress
decides to re-enact the MBE provision," it should include findings which
demonstrate a continued compelling need to set aside funds for minority
businesses."' This need can be determined at that time by examination of
updated statistics on minority participation in the construction industry.'
MARK C. RUSSELL
66 Scherer, supra note 95 at 28.
See id.
" 438 U.S. at 302 n.41. In Bakke, Justice Powell stated that the Court had previously
recognized Congress' "special competence . . . to make findings with respect to the effects
of identified past discrimination and its discretionary authority to take appropriate remedial
measures." Id.
11 Three bills were introduced in Congress which would have authorized further federal
grants for local public works projects. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Secretary of Commerce,
459 F. Supp. 766, 774-75 (C.D. Cal. 1978) (opinion on remand). See H.R. 11610, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess., 124 CONG. REc. H. 2184 (daily ed. March 16, 1978); H.R. 12993, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.,
124 CONG. REc. H. 5062 (daily ed. June 6, 1978); S.R. 3186, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., 124 CONG.
Rc. S. 8845 (daily ed. June 8, 1978). Rather than allocating a fixed 10% of these federal funds
for MBE's in each locality, the proposed bills provided that the MBE share would reflect the
percentage of minority group members in the community. MBE's would receive a "fixed
share" of between two to fifteen percent of the funds, while the nationwide "target" figure
for MBE funding was set at 10%. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., 459 F. Supp. at
775.
"" Fullilove v. Kreps, 443 F. Supp. 253, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Constructors Ass'n of W.
Pa. v. Kreps, 441 F. Supp. 936, 953-54 (W.D. Pa. 1977). In Bakke, Justice Powell stated that
"remedial action usually remains subject to continuing oversight to assure that it will work
the least harm possible to other persons competing for the benefit." 438 U.S. at 308. Thus, if
Congress re-enacts the MBE provision, it should include a finding that the set aside program
is not imposing an unduly burden upon non-minority contractors.
Ol See Fullilove v. Kreps, 584 F.2d 600, 607 (2d Cir. 1978).
